During a Bloomberg interview at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) Gen. Anil Chauhan obliquely admitted to the loss of Indian Air Force (IAF) fighters. However, he left the quantity vague, leading to further speculation about the number of fighters shot down by the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) on the night of May 6-7. According to him, the number of fighters lost did not matter; what mattered was that the IAF made tactical adjustments, after which it flew in full force on May 10.>
Vague admission, stark reality>
The reality is that the number of IAF fighters lost does matter, as they serve as evidence that the IAF has not learned the key lesson from the 2019 Balakot air attack: the urgent need to improve Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities. The losses were also proof of the robustness of the digital ecosystems supporting both sides’ fighters, particularly significant given that the two air forces would likely lead any future India-Pakistan conflict.>
Operation Sindoor provided an irrefutable glimpse of the next hot war. Hence, my focus is not on what happened, but on what lies ahead with greater certainty.>
After Operation Sindoor, the Indian military is more vulnerable in a hot war with Pakistan, as its limitations in conducting campaigns across multiple war domains have been exposed. These domains include air, land, the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) for EW, space and cyber. While the Pakistan military’s vulnerabilities were also exposed, they will likely be addressed more quickly—with full backing from China—enabling surge operations against the Indian military.>
Moreover, the operation has not ended in a ceasefire accepted by both sides, but in a “new normal” that has brought the war threshold dangerously low, with only a temporary “pause” in hostilities. This “new normal” involves the use of missiles, artillery and drones along the entire India-Pakistan border and against major cities in the hinterland. Once either side decides to end the pause, it will become a hot war involving the complete military power of both nations. Here, Pakistan’s advantage would be insurmountable, as China has publicly committed to supporting its strategic partner’s security and sovereignty.>
Glimpse of a future war>
Care was taken during the recent operation by both sides not to use ballistic missiles which are identified as nuclear vectors. This means that in a hot war, India and Pakistan will be careful to keep their campaign below the nuclear threshold. This will not be easy since both nations are peer military competitors; hence, neither side will be able to control the escalation ladder. Things will become further complicated with the “new normal” as the starting point. Hence, the campaign would be high-tempo, high-intensity, attrition-heavy, short-duration (no more than two weeks) and decisive with defined military aims. Given this scenario, it would be left to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to ensure that the nuclear threshold is not crossed— by Pakistan, or by India for that matter. The PLA has the capabilities to do this.>
Three key peculiarities could lead to a hot war.>
First, at all stages of India-Pakistan relations—peacetime, crisis, pre-war and hot war—Pakistan will not only consult China but will also accept its geopolitical, political and military advice.>
Second, given (a) the certainty that India will not accept Pakistan’s offer of composite dialogue to discuss terrorism, water and Kashmir, and (b) Pakistan’s elongated geography, which makes it naturally vulnerable to India’s long-range fires—especially those of BrahMos and S-400 systems, Pakistan may take a more proactive approach in the next round of conflict. This could include striking first. It may also expand the area of operations, as seen in its recent cyber-attacks in Kashmir. Finally, Pakistan is likely to make faster decisions at all levels—strategic, operational, and tactical—in order to stay ahead of India. Thus, even though Gen. Asim Munir’s four-star rank was sufficient to sidestep civilian leadership in decision-making on war and peace with India, he needed elevation to the five-star rank of Field Marshal to serve as the single point for all military decisions involving the three defence services and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), since they are all four-star officers.>
Third, the Pakistan military will wage All Domain Operations—beyond Multi Domain Operations (explained later)—with a definite role for its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to intensify proxy war and terrorism in India. All Domain Operations refer to simultaneous conventional and non-conventional campaigns. Unlike earlier wars fought between the two countries, there will be no frontline on the battlefield. Instead, the entire battlespace will serve as the combat zone. Given this reality, collateral damage will be unavoidable.>
Let’s now consider key operational gaps observed during Operation Sindoor. During the air battle on the night of May 6-7, it became clear that three elements—or “the trio”—were crucial for modern air warfare: high-end fighters and precision long-range missiles; a digital ecosystem to support the fighter pilot; and professional training to synchronise the two for seamless and secure communications, good situational awareness and long-range targeting. Such an ecosystem ensures that one’s own kill chain closes faster than the enemy’s, leading to fighter kills. The kill chain involves three steps: quickly understanding the situation, making fast decisions about what to do and taking action to neutralise the threat. Thus, the better the synchronisation of the trio, the more fighter kills will result, leading to air superiority that enables quicker and more secure movement of land forces. Therefore, buying good fighters and missiles without a robust digital ecosystem and years of real combat training to optimise both would not be effective.>
China’s hand in Pakistan’s warfighting strategy>
As stated by Air Marshal Aurangzeb Ahmed of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), the latter had adopted a new warfare concept called Multi Domain Operations (MDO). MDO is a digital ecosystem comprising satellites, all airborne and ground assets and fighters connected by Link-17 software to support pilots with quick and comprehensive situational awareness, fast sensor fusion and excellent Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities to jam enemy communications. China’s BeiDou satellite constellation helped with situational awareness, while its specialised Yaogan satellite facilitated identification of Indian radars, fighters and all military equipment with electronics through Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) and Signal Intelligence (SIGINT).>
While not discussing the IAF’s digital ecosystem for obvious reasons, it should be noted that four factors can make a significant difference. These are: (a) Effective EW capabilities; (b) Standardisation of fighters and accompanying systems for better integration, resulting in smooth communications. This means that integration of fighters purchased from diverse nations will lack standardisation and will be vulnerable to cyber-attacks; (c) Professional combat training in realistic scenarios; (d) Integration of space assets (satellites) into the digital ecosystem.>
Regarding the fighters with the PAF, the combination of Chinese 4.5-generation J-10C fighters and PL-15 air-to-air missiles performed exceptionally well in Operation Sindoor. Buoyed by this success, PAF pilots are already in China training on China’s fifth-generation J-35A fighter, which will be armed with the PL-17 next-generation, 400km Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missile. The PL-15 has a range of 300km. Compared to the J-10C, the J-35A is an air superiority stealth fighter with a better sensor suite featuring advanced C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) capabilities and can carry a larger weapons load in its internal bay. Moreover, the J-35A, like all modern aircraft, will have robust EW and cyber capabilities in its attack profile. Working together, the EW would attack vulnerabilities in the enemy’s electromagnetic signals that carry data/information for communications, while cyber would inject malware (malicious software) into those vulnerabilities to destroy the flight control systems. While the PAF is to receive 40 J-10C and J-35A fighters, more would be provided if needed.>
Pakistan’s biggest vulnerability is its lack of geographic depth. For example, most PAF airbases are covered by Russian S-400 interceptors and BrahMos missiles. This would require a densely layered, formidable network of integrated air and missile defence systems that can shoot down missiles and aircraft from great distances, as well as high-powered jammers to destroy their ability to communicate. China will help with this since it has established its counter-intervention strategy, which the US military calls the Anti-Access, Area Denial (A2/AD) system, against Taiwan, and has deployed a smaller version of it against India on the Line of Actual Control in Tibet. For this purpose, China will provide its HQ-19 system, capable of intercepting Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles with a 2,000km range, and perhaps its FK-400 mobile air defence system, which produces high-powered microwave weapons, to Pakistan. These weapons generate high-frequency electromagnetic waves to destroy the electronics of drones, loitering munitions and aircraft in one sweep. The weapons can be launched from both vehicles and ground platforms. Moreover, China has committed to providing its KJ-500 Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C) aircraft and additional CM-400 AKG Air-Launched Ballistic Missiles (ALBM), which performed well against India.>
The battle has no frontlines anymore>
Moreover, since there will be no frontline and the entire battlespace will be available for deep targeting, the Pakistan military will need robust air defences to protect major cities and other Vulnerable Points (VPs) and Vulnerable Areas (VAs). Here too, the PLA will assist the Pakistan military. The important factor is that China will not be selling its equipment to Pakistan through a commercial deal. Instead, its aim will be to ensure that Pakistan wins against India in a hot war, with favourable geopolitical implications for China. Also, by providing its cutting-edge platforms to its closest ally, Pakistan, China will have its equipment operationally validated, improving prospects for global arms sales. For example, after the strong performance of the J-10C in Operation Sindoor, Indonesia is considering purchasing them.>
Regarding the issue of Pakistan winning in a hot war, China providing its “assassin’s mace” weapons to Pakistan should not be ruled out. The term refers to weapons that provide a decisive advantage against an adversary. These could include China’s hypersonic cruise missiles or Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs), which operate at altitudes between 20km and 100km above earth level. This would provide two advantages to China: since India does not have an answer to these weapons, they would destabilise the Indian military. Also, operational validation of these systems would serve as the PLA’s deterrence against its primary adversary, the US military. Furthermore, China could also provide thermobaric warheads to the Pakistan Army. These weapons suck all oxygen out of bunkers, turning them into fuel ready to be ignited.>
While the Pakistan military gets its drones from both Turkey and China, the latter could provide its state-of-the-art drones to Pakistan. These include the GJ-11, CH-7, WZ-9 Divine Eagle and WZ-8, and even its large drone carriers, which carry and launch hundreds of drones in coordinated swarms. The swarms can overwhelm enemy air defences through AI-powered coordination. The swarms could also include loitering munitions.>
India’s strategic dilemma, China’s geopolitical victory>
The PLA’s closeness with the Pakistan military can be gauged by the fact that since 2021, Pakistani officers have reportedly been embedded in the PLA’s Western Theatre Command, which is responsible for the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, and in the Xinjiang Military Division, which is responsible for Ladakh. What is more, Pakistani officers are posted as observers in the PLA’s Joint Staff Department, the highest operational centre responsible for conventional and nuclear war planning.>
The ultimate irony is this: through Operation Sindoor, India has not achieved its political objective of ending Pakistan’s proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir. It has also not accomplished the military aim of establishing deterrence against the Pakistan military. If anything, this operation has enhanced China’s global profile as a reliable friend capable of walking the talk. Worse, India today stands at the edge of a disastrous hot war from which it will need both sagacity and pragmatism to walk back.>
(Pravin Sawhney’s most recent book is The Last War: How AI Will Shape India’s Final Showdown with China)>
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